Thoughts on Revolution

Revolutions are invented by intellectuals, made by fanatics, and serve only the opportunists." -- Otto von Bismarck

The hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who, in a time of moral crisis, maintain their neutrality." -- St. Thomas Aquinas

by Freiheit*

July 30, 2002

There have been recently a series of articles dealing with strategy and objectives of white nationalists in general terms, namely Jasa Slovjanski's "Stop the Hate," M. Adam's "On Achieving Power," and Gerald Morris' answer to this last one. It may seem strange that I put Mr. Slovjanski's article along with the two others, as it deals not with the revolution but with the present-day movement. However, it shall be seen to be in every way as relevant as the others. In the three, there are many good suggestions, much speculation, but I think they all have missed something important. This is why I offer my two-cents' worth. It will be a bit long, but, I hope, useful.

In the first place, I must say I was taken aback by the vitriol in Morris' article. It is always difficult to tell where argument ends and character-bashing begins, but the adjectives Mr. Morris applies to Mr. Adams, and the suggestion he sends information to Abe Foxman, etc., certainly are past that frontier. This kind of provocateurism does not further internal union, much less clarity in the discussion of long-term objectives and the way to achieve them.


Let us start with the obvious basic. White Nationalism is defined by the belief that the European peoples are worth preserving. This is all. In itself, it does not matter the reason for this belief, or what other beliefs are joined, or what is the best way of achieving it, or the price one is prepared to pay to achieve it. In this way, libertarians, socialists, communists, individualists, atheists, catholics, protestants, can all be White Nationalists. It is obvious that some ideologies/religions are more easily compatible with this objective (it is hard to think of, but not impossible to conceive, a Communist or Buddhist white nationalist), but they are not included in it.

Well, the way I have defined it, and which seems to only reasonable way to do it, it is also evident that White Nationalism cannot stand as a complete ideology on its own. You say, "I believe European peoples must be preserved"; now, so what? What is to be done? White Nationalism per se does not answer this question -- this is why I think it is very important to discuss what the hell we want to do.

Despite the fact that White Nationalism per se does not give us answers, it gives us a moral compass with which to weigh options. Every one of you reading this article knows it already, consciously or not: what furthers the survival of European peoples is moral, what does not is immoral. Now, of course, in practice, there will always be dissension in deciding what furthers survival and what does not in specific situations, but the margin of disagreement is much, much smaller than if we do not recognize this principle; and moreover, this dissession is much more factual than metaphysical, and so more easily resolved by discussion rather than force.

With the long-term objective of White Nationalism being survival, we now ask, so what? As it is obvious and self-evident that the present socio-political organization of the Western World is going to destroy the European race, the short-term objective of White Nationalists must be to destroy the present system and to replace it with another more conducive to the long-term objectives. This event we call "The Revolution." Note that the terms I used are extremely abstract: what exactly is a system "more conducive to the long-term objectives"? Will it be, for example, a democracy, a monarchy, a dictatorship? What will be its economic organization? Will it be intended as temporary (say, a "transition period") or permanent? Of course, this is at present pure speculation, as the Revolution is all but near; but if we don't know where we are heading, we will get nowhere. And, as practically every one of us has an opinion about it, we must at least know what the other is thinking. In practice, the pragmatical attitude is more common and more correct: the present system is so corrupt that almost anything would be better than it; and the one thing the Revolution is sure to accomplish is to replace the present ruling élite with one at least more identified with White Nationalism, and that would be an improvement anyway.

What then is the White Nationalist movement? A concise and somewhat disrespectful definition would be "a bunch of people who agree on little more than that the European peoples must survive, and that this entails the destruction of the present system." In this context I see the importance of Jasa Petrovic Slovjanski's article: his call for internal union, for shredding secondary differences to achieve the common objective is not only right in itself, but will have to be repeated at every point in the road to Revolution. The extremely great number of ideologies and currents of thought which are compatible, or can be made compatible with, White Nationalism, makes our movement especially prone to internal dissension. This is, by the way, increased by the fact that we have no "illuminated leader" in the past in the way the Communists had Marx as a common point of reference in their dissensions. In all their subtle quarrels, Leninists, Reformists, Stalinists, Trotskyists, Gramscists, etc., all quoted Marx and attempted to prove that he would have agreed with them, if he were alive. To some this was easier to do than to others, but all tried to do it, even the reformists which Marx himself condemned. The only historical figure that could be thought to serve this purpose for us would be Hitler. There are only two problems: (1) National-Socialism is a much less-developed ideology, in intellectual terms, than is Marxism (this entails no statement as to what each contains of truth), and so is much less useful as an element of union; (2) many White Nationalists are not National-Socialists (I personally am not, although I would prefer, if I had the choice, to live under Hitler than under present-day Western régimes). The need for union is therefore very great.


We now get to "The Revolution." There are two things, entirely dissimilar, which are involved in it: (1) Making the Revolution; (2) Maintaining and consolidating the revolutionary government. There have been tons of revolutions in the last two centuries, but very few succeeded in making the second phase; one has only to think of the Communist revolutions all over Europe at the end of the First World War, every one of which failed to the chagrin of Lenin; or of the many revolutions and counter-revolutions in the 20th-century history of Latin America. This point is, I believe, overlooked by both Mr. Adams and Mr. Morris, and I believe attention to it will ease the dissensions between them.

In his article, Mr. Adams cites the following examples: (1) Sulla, Crassus, Caesar and Augustus in the end of the Roman Republic; (2) Adolf Hitler. He says that in both examples they worked "within the system" to achieve revolution. Mr. Morris slams against the examples, saying in effect that the end of the Roman Republic was no revolution, as the persons involved were well-placed initially; and he also says, remarkably, that the rise of National Socialism was no revolution as well, and that Hitler failed to make it because he "compromised," the great sin he accuses Mr. Adams of defending. Mr. Morris cites examples of traitors in the National-Socialist hierarchy (Hjalmar Schacht), and concludes, in capital letters: "WORKING WITHIN THE SYSTEM IS NO WAY TO CARRY OFF A REVOLUTION!"

He continues: "The point is not to tail events and wait for something to happen but to MAKE THINGS HAPPEN! A small, well-disciplined revolutionary organization can do just that. It won't be easy, but we are fighting for our lives and the lives of our posterity. We have no choice but victory or surrender." This is all very heart-stirring, but no organization, no matter how well-disciplined or truly revolutionary, can do that. EVERY SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION began with an incredibly stupid decision by the powers-that-be (or that-were): the Assembly of the Notables (representative of the nobility) refusal to consider changes in fiscal law in France in 1787; Louis XVI's decision not to punish the separate meeting of the representatives of the Third Estate in May 1789 (it was forbidden by law, and the army wanted him to use it); the Tsar's trying to take political representation from the only social basis of support he had (struggle against the Duma, 1905-1914), and finally the Tsar's refusal to punish mutinied soldiers (beginning of the February Revolution of 1917). More examples could be cited, of these and other situations. There was nothing inevitable about Revolution in each of these cases, and if the Ancien Régime had not made very, very dumb decisions, they could well have maintained or reformed themselves: no amount of "well-disciplined revolutionary organizations" could have made a Revolution against a united front.

He also says that: "Before laying the matter of Lenin and Leninism to rest, let's consider some of Lenin's methods and principles. I certainly agree with Adams as far as adopting communist tactics goes. Lenin led a tight little organization of just a few thousand members to absolute power over a large empire." [Implication: as Lenin was against every kind of compromise, it is evidence in favor of Mr. Morris position.] However, that is not the whole truth. Lenin was able to lead "a tight little organization of just a few thousand members to absolute power over a large empire" only because he had support abroad (1). He only succeeded in making the Revolution because of Jewish support, both in America and in the Pale of Settlement (2). And that was not enough: he would have been destroyed in 1918 if it weren't for the vast quantities of money the German Government gave him. Even this was not enough: in the middle of 1918, the Germans agreed to send their army into Russia to fight against the anti-Communist armies (they did go, but in the end did not have to fight, the anti-Communists fled the area). Now, with this unwavering foreign support, such a tactic may well be successful: but where is foreign support for a White Nationalist Revolution? Who among non-white races has interest in financing a revival of the Western World (and money to do it in a meaningful way)? Lenin's success formula is simply not applicable to us.

Now let us return to the two phases described above, and their relevance to the question of "compromise or non-compromise," in Mr. Morris' terms (with which, by the way, I disagree). What are the necessary preconditions for the making of a Revolution? The first and obvious one is revolutionary-minded individuals (us); the second is lack of legitimacy of the present government in the eyes of a great part of the people (it was very easy to delegitimize power in Absolutist France and Tsarist Russia -- we must delegitize "democracy," and show it is nothing but dictatorship with a beautiful veneer; and this must be done both intelectually and with the people -- and is obviously beyond the limits of this article); the third is, as I have already said, an incredibly dumb decision by the Ancién Régime that opens the way for revolution.

Now, why does the Ancién Régime make these dumb decisions and pave the way for a revolutionary situation? Doesn't it know its interests, and the results of these actions? Just plain dumbness notwithstanding, in most cases it is simply because it has no choice. One must always remember that, no matter how powerful or intrusive or totalitarian the government is, it cannot control everything. And every act which it does in its own interests has consequences, not all of which can be predicted at the time the decision was made. It does happen that situations put political power in a corner, having to choose between different options, all of which require the sacrifice of something to save or increase the rest (the something may be very small). In other words, the moment of truth is when one part of the ruling élite has to part with some of the established privileges it has, either in order to save the rest, or to increase it, etc. The revolutionary moment happens when the ruling élite splits: some support the government's action, and other continue to defend another line of action. The internal debate in the élite continues, because no government can kill off its own social basis of support (the moment the government kills the recalcitrant part of the élite, the rest become fearful for their lives, and will precipitate the fall of the government to save themselves -- if the government can kill one part of the élite, it can kill the other as well). As the rift widens, the opinion, position, etc., of non-élite forces grow steadily. The losing part of the élite tries to increase its strength by giving vent to some popular demands; however, in every case the process proceeds so far so rapidly that the élite is submerged (as there is a limit to how far it will go in answering popular demands), and this is the beginning of the Revolution. This happened with the French nobility pre-1789, and with the Tsarist aristocracy pre-1917. In the turmoil, coups d'État become possible (e.g. the Communist coup of October 1917), and it becomes impossible to stop the Revolution and re-establish the Ancien Régime. In the revolutionary situation small, organized, non-compromising and revolutionary-minded groups can take power. Here the example of the Bolsheviks is illuminating. But here only.

How does "compromise" appear here? It is, I believe, obvious that neither White Nationalists nor anyone else can make a Revolution against the élite as a united front. We will also have to wait for the rift to appear, and to prepare, as did the Leninists, to act decisively when the moment comes. When a tough decision is to be made and the élite splits, part of it will start courting support by taking up some of our positions (some have been doing it even before, e.g. anti-immigration activists). What is to be our answer? I believe it is obvious, and fully agree with what Lenin said and did when that moment arrived for him: we must refuse every collaboration with the élite. This is what Lenin said when he arrived in St. Petersburg from exile, to the shock of his correligionaries who were, with the rest of the socialist factions, collaborating with the part of the élite that deposed the Tsar. The "new" élite (which was already a part of the old) must be quickly overthrown, before it has time to consolidate its power. I do not need to point out that, in the case of White Nationalists, a similar situation is at best many years in the future.

As a detail, a comment about Weimar Germany. It is evident that Hitler's rise to power does not conform to a violent revolutionary period model of the kind commented upon above. However, I believe it can also be used as an example, for the entire Weimar period was one of internal division among Germany's ruling élite. This division was along the line of what we can call the "old" and the "new" élite. Imperial, pre-WWI Germany had, as every nation does, an established political and economical élite. After WWI and the fall of the II Reich, a new political élite took power (members of the reformist Social-Democratic Party); this élite managed to maintain political power both against the right (several putsch attempts in 1919-1921) and the extreme left (the Spartacist League). One point to be kept in mind is that the new political élite had weak economic power, and what it had was mainly via Jewish nouveau-riches' support of socialism. So we had a new political élite, with a weak economic power which was identified with non-Germans, the Jews; and an old political-economic élite, which had lost much of its political power, but kept its economic power. Hitler perceived that, and took his side with the old German élite. After the his failed coup d'État in 1923, he tried, successfully but only very gradually, to convince the old German élite that he would destroy the new élite, if they gave him their support; and if they refused to act, they would be destroyed by the new élite. Of course, élites only take drastic and potentially inflammable measures when they are forced to: the growth of Communism was Hitler's greatest ally. The new political élite's (which was, after all, originally Socialists) lukewarm position towards Communism gave Hitler the place of the only force which could save the old élite. I won't enter here into the question of whether Hitler was a sincere revolutionary who was using the old élite to gain power, or an opportunist who reinforced the old élite and fooled the people with beautiful slogans. I believe, however, that the six years of National-Socialist government in Germany in peace-time demonstrate that Hitler was sincere, and that he tried to get rid of the old élite by playing upon its internal dissensions, in a very gradual and perilous game (if he went too obviously against it, his social basis of support would collapse). From what I understand of Mr. Morris' article, he doubts Hitler's sincerity (or his intelligence).


Napoleon is reported to have said to one of his brothers, on arriving at the Tuileries: "We've arrived. Now we must find a way to remain here." Taking power is one thing, keeping it another.

To keep things simple and not too much speculatory, let's remember what power is. Hitler defined three characteristics: popular will, force, and time. Every regime not founded on popular support will, in the long run, fall; the regime must either conform itself to obvious popular will, or remake the popular will to suit what it already is doing anyway. It is obvious which kind of action happens today. Besides popular will, force is also necessary, for the regime must be able to achieve its objectives unconstrained by individual selfishness. Force alone, however, can only sustain a regime for a small period of time. The third point is the strength of tradition, the feeling of "things have been this way since time immemorial." The truly established, consolidated regime, whatever it is, must be based in general terms on these three elements.

Suppose (or dream) that the White Nationalist Revolution has taken place, whatever the context is. It is obvious that we don't possess the third element (tradition). I don't see any way of changing the opinion of the masses ("the lemmings," as Dr. Pierce calls them) before the Revolution, so popular will will not be favourable to us; at best it will be lukewarm. The only alternative to this would be civil-war scenario in which all established powers successively fall, until ours is the only option left; but I find this Turner-Diaries possibility extremely, extremely unlikely. The conclusion is that, immediately after the Revolution, the strongest, if not the only base of our power, shall be force. Popular support and legitimacy by tradition will have to be built afterwards.

How are we to defeat counter-revolution? Of course, it all depends on specific conditions which cannot be predicted, but I don't think it is a wise move to antagonize all previous "insiders" and throw them into the arms of counter-revolution. It is in this light that I see, positively, Hitler's actions (dubbed by Morris "compromising"): he tried at the same time not to throw the old élite in the arms of his enemies, and to transform portions of it into true supporters of the revolutionary régime (the most eloquent example is the son of former Kaiser Wilhelm II, who enthusiasically supported Hitler, despite the fact that Hitler's rise to power killed every hope of future restoration of the Kaiser), while taking all their power of control over the government (controlled by the Nazi Party) and economic policy (government economic regulation). They remained rich, but their riches could not easily buy political power. Lenin and Trotsky did this even more obviously: in the "Red Army of Workers and Peasants," over 75% of the officialdom was composed of former Tsarist officers (remember that only the nobility could reach officialdom under Tsarism). The same happened in the Organizations of Production; the workers complained that, formerly, they worked for Mr. Serguei under capitalism; now, under communism, they continued working for Mr. Serguei, but Mr. Serguei wasn't the owner of the business anymore, he was its government-appointed overseer. By the way, Mr. Serguei couldn't order them to be killed for a trifle under capitalism, but now under communism he could!

It is obvious that we don't desire the extreme corruption and outright lying of the communist revolutionary aftermath, which fully justified the prescient Bismarck phrase I quoted in the beginning. While keeping our objectives in view, depending on the specific situation, "compromise" may be either bad and traitorous, or the only way and therefore good. It is not per se one or the other. Until the revolution (that is: now), I don't see any problem in "working within the system," or "infiltrating institutions." The problem of government spies in the movement is to me beside the point, as spies will exist whether we work "within" or "outside" the system. At worst, it will bring us no good. At best, one well-positioned person in what I called a revolutionary moment can do much to further the White Nationalist cause.



(1) Mr. Morris implies that Mr. Adams was wrong when he said Lenin collaborated with Tsarism. This is not correct. The official journal of the Bolsheviks, which Lenin founded in Switzerland in the 1900s, Iskra, was financed and overseed by a man Lenin knew was a Tsarist spy. Some time before the Revolution he was exposed, but Lenin defended him and he was kept. After the Revolution, this guy was killed. It is rather obvious that Lenin accepted it because it was the only way he had at the time to finance his journal, and it did not imply that Tsarism had bought him off. The Tsar gained in turn knowledge of the internal workings of the Bolshevik Party. These informations are in Richard Pipes (Jew), Concise History of the Russian Revolution. New York, 1994.

(2) The Pale of Settlement was the area to which Jews were restricted by law in Tsarist Russia. It encompasses basically Western Russia, along with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, etc.

(3) As a detail, Mr. Morris accuses Himmler of being a traitor and of not redeeming himself at Nuremberg. I don't think it so easy to decide; he did what he did in the last weeks of the war, when Hitler was dreaming of a super-counterattack at his bunker, and Germany was being destroyed uselessly. Whatever one thinks, Himmler is certainly innocent of the charge of not redeeming himself at Nuremberg: he was murdered by the British much before the "trial" (officially, he committed suicide with a hidden poison pill, one day after surrendering himself to the British; very strange behaviour, why surrender if you planned suicide?)


* I am a 20-year-old South American white male who believes White Nationalism is a Pan-European ideal, and that the revolution must start in the United States, otherwise it will be crushed by it. I'm not a member of any organization, and write under a pseudonym as in "my" homeland dissension from NWO rules is punishable by a long period of imprisonment. By the way, these are about the only laws which are really enforced here... I also ask indulgence for my English, as it is not my mother-language.


Tell a friend about this article:

Back to VNN Main Page