Vanguard News Network

by Michael O’Meara

Le Pen’s trouncing in the first round of the
presidential voting was a great disappointment to
racial nationalists — not because they identified
with his campaign or thought a National Front victory
possible, but because a large Le Pen vote would have
constituted a popular assault on the System’s
legitimacy and thus another consciousness-raising step
in the development of their movement.

That this did not occur simply added to their
countless defeats since 1945.

To the System’s media commentators, the election
represented a reconquest of the ground loss after
2002, when Le Pen, against all expectation, advanced
to the second round of the presidential election. His
place in this earlier run-off had had a powerful
effect on subsequent French and European politics,
even though he was soundly defeated, for his mere
presence as a finalist brought the dreaded “extreme
right” (i.e., the nationalist right) into a position
of prominence, making not only Third World immigration
an unavoidable topic of political debate, but helping
prepare the stunning defeat of the globalist forces in
the April 2005 referendum on the EU Constitution.

The election of 2007 is thus being touted as having
reversed the results of the 2002 election. In this
spirit, the System’s champions are everywhere
celebrating Le Pen’s poor showing. Germany’s foreign
minister characterized the election as a “defeat for
extremists,” Spain’s foreign minister said it was
“good news” for French democracy, and Jose Manuel
Barroso, president of the European Commission (the
EU’s executive) was barely able to contain himself,
praising the vitality of French democracy and its
positive effects on the (globalists’) European
project. In a similar vein, Le Monde called the low
nationalist vote “the revenge of April 21, 2002,”
while the “respectable” conservative press emphasized
both the resurgence of democracy (in the high voter
turnout) and the retreat of the extremists (i.e., the
NF).

Le Pen’s elimination from the second round is
accordingly seen as sign that things are back on track
in France and that the country representing the axis
of all possible European development is again posed to
resume the painful, but necessary, transition to the
Euro-globalist modes favored by Washington, Brussels,
and Tel Aviv. Relatedly, talk of re-imposing the EU
Constitution (after the French referendum had shelved
all prospect of it) is once more reverberating in the
corridors of power.

The media/System spin on the election, however, is
hardly the whole story.

Though a terrible blow to the National Front and,
implicitly, to the racial nationalist project, Le
Pen’s poor showing was neither a categorical setback
for nationalist ideas nor an unmitigated victory for
the anti-white forces. More importantly, the election
itself, despite its outcome, gave a positive turn to
the crisis threatening the white nations of the West,
reaffirming both the contemporary and perennial
relevance of certain ethno-racial principles.

The prospects facing nationalists (racial and
otherwise) are, then, not quite as bleak as some in
their ranks would have us believe. Rather than
despairing of the electoral setback, the important
thing at this stage is to draw the proper lessons from
it.

LA GRANDE NATION

The single most consequential significance of the
election was not the NF’s defeat, but its affirmation
of the nation. Contrary to the prevailing media
commentary, the high voter turnout (nearly 84 percent)
said less about democracy (which, after all, is only
an instrument of governance) than it did about French
concern for their collective destiny.

It is hardly coincidental that this affirmation of the
nation occurred in France, which sees herself — and
is seen by a large part of the world — as “la Grande
Nation.” Indeed, it is arguable that France is the
only great nation left in the West, even if her
economy is stagnating, her military capacities
neglected, and “declinist” sentiments dominate her
public discourse. (Americans, of course, will bristle
at the thought that France is a great nation, given
that their view of Europe, France preeminently, is
largely that of the anti-European neocons; but it
makes it no less true).

Ever since the Latin-speaking Celts of Rome’s Gaullic
province fell under the leadership of the Germanic
Franks, the lands comprising France have constituted
not only the heartland of Europe, but the axis around
which European civilization grew. For more than 1500
years, the continent’s various national families,
including the Russian-speaking Slavs loyal to Moscow
and the extraordinary, but now politically impotent
German-speaking peoples dominating Central Europe,
have, in recognition of her pivotal role, taken France
as their principal civilizational reference.

Today, however, France’s destiny as a great nation is
on the skids. The ultraliberal, anti-white forces of
global capitalism — headquartered in Jewish New York,
inspired by the “ideology of consummate
meaninglessness,” and led by Brussels’ American-style
technocracy — seek the nation’s destruction. In
imposing its multicultural dictates at the expense of
national cultures, in racially blending populations by
allowing the Third World to invade and colonize the
First World, and in sacrificing every qualitative
ascription for the sake of the market’s quantitative
monetary values, globalism’s nihilistic impetus
undermines not just the historic nation-state, but all
forms of ethnic/national/racial identity. Given
France’s distinct national destiny, the Hebraic norms
and creedal postulates of globalism’s borderless
market have set off a civilizational and existential
crisis significantly more acute than elsewhere in the
former white world.

Though the election campaign began with an emphasis on
economic modernization, it quickly evolved into a
debate on national identity and sovereignty. The
System’s failure to economically modernize in ways
that allowed the French to remain French has, in fact,
undermined much of its legitimacy and forced its
politicians to re-focus their campaigns on the crisis
besetting the nation — the crisis, as Philippe
Grasset (at dedefensa.org) defines it, that is born of
global liberalism’s nihilistic assault on every
traditional ontological reference.

In response to the French reaction, the “progressive
forces” throughout the European Union — among the
board members of the great corporations who denounce
France’s so-called “Marxist social culture,” as well
as among the revolutionary Trotskyists of the Fourth
International, who bemoan France’s obsession with the
“nationalist right” — are united in despairing of her
refusal to adjust to the social-economic imperatives
of globalization. This is not to say that France is
not already heavily globalized, but for the radical
progressives on both the right and left the on-going
resistance to globalization — along with the national
anxieties associated with it — are cause for concern,
for nothing can get done in Europe without French
support.

The national or identitarian focus of the presidential
election of 2007 contrasts starkly with the election
of 1995, which brought fourteen years of Socialist
Party (PS) rule to an end and the so-called right to
power. In the 1995 election, sovereigntists and
nationalists had almost no role to play, for the
hegemonic globalist forces associated with the
recently passed Maastricht treaty were nearly
unchallenged in touting the advent of the new
postmodern era. Its “end of history” ideology —
positively identified with the “Washington Consensus”
and negatively with Yeltsin’s collapsing Russia — was
to do away with the antiquated nation-state and give
the “rationalizing” forces of the free market full
reign. In step with elites in other white nations,
the French political class preceded to cast off
whatever vestige of allegiance it still had to the
nation’s history and tradition, just as its
implantation of Third World immigrant populations in
the European heartland was used to subvert the notion
that France was a white, Christian country. The
ethnocidal implications of this naturally took a great
toll on the French, but not without a certain poetic
justice. For globalism today is itself in crisis, as
world-open America flounders and nationalist Russia
resurges.

The racial-civilizational crisis affecting the former
white nations of the West, for reasons suggested
above, is most acute in France, for the question of
national identity — of who we are — lies at the
center of this crisis and the French, as bearers of
the Grande Nation, are best situated to sense its
gravity. Will Hutton in the Guardian (4-15) thus
writes: “Most Europeans have uncertainties about
American-style free markets. It is the French [,
however,] who have turned that uncertainty into a
cult. And [though] there is a general European doubt
about the racial, ethnic other, Muslims especially, .
. . it is the French who have created the phenomenon
that is Le Pen.”

In ways that defy ready interpretation, but are
probably best understood in reference to De Maistre’s
providential concept of destiny, the French electorate
in the first round demanded that the candidates
address the great questions of identity, sovereignty,
and meaning posed by globalism’s nihilistic
destructuralization of traditional national
references.

Though the majority of the voters ended up picking
candidates who are very much part of the System, these
candidates were all nevertheless compelled to present
themselves as alternatives to it. However faultingly
and mistakenly, the electorate in the first round
demonstrated its allegiance to the nation, implicitly
rejecting globalism’s raceless-cultureless concept of
Europe. As Grasset argues, the electorate used the
System’s electoral apparatus to reject all notion that
the System’s market principles are ends in themselves.

In face of this, the System’s politicians had no
choice but to take up the question of national
identity. Accordingly, they all (in contradiction to
everything they had previously stood for) called for
economic protectionism, criticized speculative
capitalism and outsourcing, opposed the EU’s current
free-market policies, especially its over-valued euro,
probed the relationship between Third World
immigration and national identity, but most of all
attempted to recuperate the symbols and concerns of
the nation. More dramatically, they all went to
great lengths to show that they had broken from the
System which they had spent their lives serving.

That the politicians’ responses to the question of
identity were dishonest and that the Jewish schemer,
Nicolas Sarkozy, was the most ardent and deceptive
responder suggest that the crisis won’t go away
anytime soon. But it does indicate that the
anti-national, anti-white System is being forced in
France to change its appearance and accommodate, at
least at the level of image, the electorate’s
prevailing concerns. This is far from what racial
nationalists demand, but it is nevertheless something
that will facilitate their defense of Europe’s
incomparable bioculture.

MARINE’S CATASTROPHE

On the evening of April 22, as news of the National
Front’s fourth place finish became known, Le Pen’s
daughter and campaign director, Marine, attempted to
put a positive spin on the humiliating defeat. Before
the TV cameras, she described the election as a
victory for Le Pen’s ideas — though with the
qualification that the French had apparently preferred
the appearance of change to actual change.

This was all quite true, but what wasn’t mentioned was
her own responsibility for the party’s poor showing.
As the nationalist Olivier Pichon put it, if the
electoral winds and ideological currents were so
favorable to the nationalist cause, then the party’s
shipwreck on April 22 must have had something to do
with those who stood at its helm.

As a political formation compelled to operate within
liberalism’s increasingly totalitarian System, the
National Front, of course, is limited to a narrow
realm of activities. Yet within this realm there is
room for maneuver and the failures of Marine’s
leadership provides both racial and historic
nationalists with valuable instructions on how not to
struggle for their cause. This is not to say that the
NF’s failure was solely Marine’s doing or that the
party didn’t face great obstacles. The entire System,
with its opinion molding media and its labyrinthine
intrigues, conspired in innumerable ways against it.
But conditions this year were such that nationalists
could have made a qualitatively greater electoral
impact than they did — one that would have shook the
System’s foundations and had far-reaching
consequences. Why, it must be asked, did the National
Front fail to do so?

Following the April 2005 referendum on the EU
Constitution and following the riots of November 2005,
when Arab and African youth carried out a three week
Jihad on the symbols and forces of French authority,
an outcry for radical change could be heard
practically everywhere in France. Le Pen’s ideas
became increasingly popular, large swaths of the
population favored a break with the System, and the
System had no candidate who could match Le Pen in
stature, experience, or culture. Marine, however,
squandered all this for certain strategic aims alien
to the nationalist movement.

Her first and most grievous error was not in trying to
“de-demonize” her much maligned father, but in how she
decided to go about doing so. Given the nature of the
liberal electoral system, it was to nationalist
advantage to present Le Pen in the most favorable
light possible. De-demonization, though, was confused
with banalization. In the name of softening the
party’s image and making it more accessible to the
media, the NF’s most fundamental and defining
principles were sacrificed, its anti-immigrant and
anti-System discourse muted, and the party became
almost undistinguishable from the System’s other
political formations in insisting that “We are not
extremists.”

By banalizing his ideas and dulling his anti-System
stance, Le Pen ceased, in effect, to pose a clear
alternative to his rivals, enabling them to plagiarize
his themes in ways that emptied them of their radical
content and turned them to the System’s advantage.
Banalization, in a word, left the party defenseless
before those poaching on its traditional grounds.
When Sarkozy appropriated the question of national
identity, Le Pen, for instance, should have struck
back, exposing both his hypocrisy and deceptiveness.
But Sarkozy’s appropriation, seen as part of the
pervasive “lepénisation des esprits” affecting the
political class, was never seriously challenged.
Instead of being exposed as a proponent of Third World
immigration, anti-white discrimination, and
multiculturalism, his fake appropriation went
unchallenged. The result: He captured a third of the
NF’s constituency, which thought his stance on
immigration tougher than Le Pen’s.

Le Pen has often said that the French prefer the
original to the copy. When he toned down his ideas
and began to dance to the System’s tune, repackaging
himself as an ardent republican concerned not with
France’s mongrelization, but with the System’s
betrayal of republican principles, he became, in
effect, just another System politician. Why, then, he
might have asked himself, should the French have
preferred his copy to the System’s original.

This was especially evident with respect to
immigration, which was Sarkozy’s biggest vote getter.
For thirty-five years the NF defined itself as the
anti-immigrant party. Under Marine’s leadership, this
changed. The party turned toward the political center
and called for the assimilation of France’s Third
World immigrants — as if those whose ancestors had
evolved in Africa’s jungles and Arabia’s deserts
could ever, in a thousand years, become French. At
the same time, the NF’s new-found assimilationism
sought to attract the immigrant vote. This pandering
to the immigrants not only caused Le Pen to abandon
the petits blancs who live in the war zones and
constituted his principal constituency, it confused
his followers, who looked to the NF to defend French
France, not the System’s multiracial one.

The party’s abandonment of its key mobilizing issue
was accompanied by a series of correspondingly stupid
moves. In the 2002 election, Le Pen had made it to
the second round partly because of the European
reaction to the 9-11 attack on America. In 2007, Le
Pen not only refused to address the threat that Islam
continues to pose to Europe and actually said positive
things about this anti-white religion, he failed to
exploit the still vivid memory of the November 2005
Jihad, which could have had the same effect on his
campaign as 9-11 had had on the 2002 election. At the
same time, he made no use of the race riot at the gare
du Nord (which, for a moment, threatened to become a
major issue) nor did he bother to exploit a series of
grisly murders by immigrants, which could have turned
whites against the System responsible for allowing
foreigners to prey on their women and children.

As a marginal party on the fringe of French politics,
the NF gave away, in effect, virtually every one of
its trump cards — doing so simply for the sake of
Marine’s misconceived strategy.

Related to this failed strategy was the NF’s neglect
of its own organization. The NF’s campaign was waged
almost entirely within the media. Given that the
party has no daily newspapers, radio, or TV stations,
only the internet, its media campaign was an extremely
limited one — and one dependent on the media’s good
graces, which could not but entail a further
compromise of its principles.

The liberal-conservative parties, with their fabulous
financial resources and their access to the levers of
power, have, of course, no need to develop militant
organizations to promote their politics — though
every once in a while even they are obliged to put
boots on the ground to wage local struggles and get
out the vote. Marine’s clique neglected both the NF’s
development as a party organization and its
relationship to the larger nationalist movement.

Since the devastating scission of 1998, little had
been done to rebuild the NF as an organization.
Nationwide it has barely 300 cadre. Its 15,000
members were thus rarely mobilized, badly
concentrated, and offered little in the way of
activity. But this could have been easily corrected.
Both the election of 2002 and the race riots of 2005
had provoked a good deal of popular interest in the
party, but nothing was done by the leadership to
translate this interest into a larger membership.

Moreover, in the course of the election most of the
party’s old guard were shunted aside, as the
“Marinists” monopolized the party’s media appearances.
This failure to build and muster the party was,
though, more than strategically foolish: It implied a
definition of the National Front foreign to every
reformist or revolutionary conception of nationalist
politics — foreign in believing that nationalist
politics could be promoted through the System and not
entail a mobilization of the nation itself.

But perhaps even more important than the party is the
movement undergirding it. Early in the campaign,
shortly after the conservative Catholic politician,
Philippe de Villiers, announced his intention to run
for the presidency on a nationalist, anti-Islam
platform, Le Pen proposed a Union des Patriotiques to
unite nationalists in a common front against the
System. This was an excellent idea, given the diverse
and factional character of country’s nationalist
movement. But it was almost immediately sabotaged by
Marine, who wanted no rivals challenging her
leadership. The Patriot Union was consequently
neglected and what could have become the basis of a
powerful mass movement was quickly abandoned.

To think the NF could have encroached on the System’s
forces without a movement comprising the numerous
parties and organizations associated with French
nationalism, without reaching out to and involving the
popular classes, connecting with various social
networks, and mobilizing thousands and thousands of
individuals to intervene in the quotidian debates that
animate every popular campaign — to think this is to
think in ways that ignore everything taught by the
last two centuries of popular political struggle. For
without a mass movement behind it, any
counter-hegemonic force is virtually unstageable. For
this too the Marinists are to be held accountable.

Many factors contributed to Le Pen’s poor showing on
April 22, but of these not a few belonged to the
current FN leadership, whose failed strategy, confused
and contradictory policies, and willful mismanagement
established precedents that future nationalists would
do well to avoid.

SÉGO OR SARKO

The great debate now dividing nationalist ranks
revolves around the question: Which of the two
remaining candidates is the lesser evil.

Choosing between the socialist Ségolène Royal and the
conservative Nicolas Sarkozy is, though, as Maurice
Thorez might have put, like choosing between the
cholera and the plague — in which case one doesn’t
choose. On all the essential issues, the two System
candidates are united — bonnet blanc and blanc
bonnet, as the French say. Like Democrats and
Republicans in the U.S. or Laborites and Likudists in
the Promised Land, they promote these essentials in
slightly different ways, but the results are
inevitably the same.

In a country whose patron saint and greatest national
hero is a woman, Jeanne d’Arc, women rarely play a
political role. France, in fact, has one of the
lowest rates of female political representation in the
industrial world. That Ségolène Royal was designated
as the left’s standard bearer is perhaps testament to
the alien forces advancing her candidacy. Rumor has
it that she was promoted by the Clinton wing of the
U.S. Democratic Party. In any case, she won her
party’s presidential nomination not because of her
ideas or her support in Socialist Party ranks, but
because the media portrayed her as the best opponent
of the right — the elegant gazelle who would outrun
and outwit the right’s lumbering elephants.

As Le Pen says, she offers France a “cuddly socialism”
that while pro capitalist projects a gentler, more
caring image than her rival, Nicolas Sarkozy. In this
spirit, she wants her countrymen to fly the flag and
sing the national anthem (like Americans) and asks
them to get along with one another by upholding the
republic’s democratic values. In her view, belief in
these values ought to transcend “insignificant”
differences in skin color, religion, or culture, for
they define her creedal conception of the nation.
With the left’s usual ardor, she also panders to the
various postmodern tribes (homosexuals, feminists,
ecologists, etc.) and proposes throwing money at the
country’s various social and racial problems.

Revealingly, her biggest constituency is no longer the
traditional working class communities that once looked
to Socialists and Communists to promote their
social-economic interests (they now look to the NF).
Her biggest constituency (estimated at 50 percent) is
made up of “français de papier” (naturalized
immigrants) and perhaps because of this she favors
France’s traditional pro-Arab foreign policy. This
has alienated her from the country’s various Jewish
lobbies and some nationalists consider this cause to
support her in the second round against her Zionist
rival. (That her “husband,” François Hollande, the PS
leader, is a member of the French American
Association, on offshoot of the American CFR and a
conduit of U.S. globalist interests, which in my mind
are nearly inseparable from Zionist interests, makes
me somewhat suspicious of this reasoning).

“Ségo,” in any case, has little chance of winning the
election. This is a period of decline for the French
left and not until the racial character of the
population undergoes further transformation and
refurbishes its constituency will its fortunes rise
again. Her opponent, Sarkozy of the “conservative”
UMP, will be the likely victor on May 6 and though “he
changes his ideas as often as he changes his shirt,”
there is little doubt as to what he represents.

“Sarko” can probably best be summed up in the epithets
he’s earned: “Le petit américain,” “Bush’s French
poodle,” “the American neocon with the French
passport.” (See Armen Nazarbekov’s “Sarko and the
Neocons: The Yid Who Would Be King,” archived at this
site). Generally speaking, he’s part of “the global
Judaification of world governments” that began after
1945 and has recently, under neocon leadership, been
extended to the former Soviet Bloc and to the Middle
East, in the guise of the “Color Revolutions” that
attempted to turn Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon into American client states.
(When he was in the U.S. last September, Sarko not
only promised Bush he would “reconsider” France’s
opposition to U.S. Mideast policy if elected, he
actively elicited the financial support and advice of
AIPAC and the American Jewish Committee).

Like Jewish neocons in the U.S., Sarko realizes it’s
no longer possible to delude the masses with the old
left/liberal formulas — whose anti-white,
race-mixing, homosexual, feminist, and emasculating
impetus is now part of the public record. Hence, the
Jewish or neocon recuperation of the largely
irrelevant conservative heritage and Sarko’s effort to
translate it into French.

Sarko may pose as the champion of national identity
and loudly condemn illegal immigration, yet, in the
spirit of his Jewish-American counterparts, he also
advocates “une France métissée.” As he recently told
the Boston Globe (4-24), “I only want one thing: To
unite the French behind a new French dream, one of a
brotherly republic where everyone will find their
place . . . where diversity will be lived not as a
threat but like a bonus.” His popular image, though,
is just the opposite of what he actually is, for he’s
widely seen as hating Islam (few Jews do) and being
tough on immigrant “youth.” That hatred for him in
the conquered territories is qualitatively greater
than it is for Le Pen is simply testament to the
media’s power of dissimulation. Saying one thing and
meaning another is second-nature to this schemer, who
has succeeded in hoodwinking much of the French right.

Most who voted for Sarko, especially that segment he
took from the NF, think he’s going to do something
about immigration. His record, however, promises
something quite different. In the five years he
served as Interior Minister he not only did nothing to
curb illegal immigration or immigrant crime, he
institutionally enfranchised Islam (making it a public
influence), he advocated voting rights for immigrants,
supported state funding of mosque construction,
advanced the notion of select immigration (Chinks
rather than Congoloids), and took up the cause of
positive discrimination. The media, which slavishly
follows his every move and gives top billing to his
dog-and pony show, has made his image stronger and
more convincing than who he actually is — not a “Le
Pen light,” but a forked-tongued schemer willing to
say and do anything for the sake of power.

Like Chirac and Giscard before him, Sarko will soon
betray the French, especially those NF voters who
mistook his image for what he really is: A talented
illusionist. Under his tutelage, France will be
turned into an American vassal and the last vestiges
of the nation’s heritage auctioned off. It won’t be
long before the French learn that he’s no different
from the crook who is about to evacuate the
presidential palace. In fact, he may even prove to be
worse. At that point in time, nationalists will get
another hearing.

PREPARING FOR THE CONVERGENCE

Whatever happens on May 6, France will be stuck with
five more years of the System and its on-going assault
on the nation. The first round of the election
perhaps made the System somewhat more discreet in its
anti-national subversions. But things are bound to
get worse.

As France is subject to further globalization and
sinks deeper into the EU magma, the immigrants hordes
will continue to displace the native French and racial
conflicts will grow more vicious and uncontrollable.
That this Afro-Arab horde — now somewhere between 10
and 15 percent of the population – has no discernable
contribution to make to either the economy or the
social system means that present conflicts are likely
to worsen, as they fail to get a larger slice of the
collective pie and the working French are forced to
tighten their belts to pay the mounting social
charges. As life in France — and not just in the war
zones — gets worse, the French will undoubtedly be
forced to consider real change rather than just its
appearance.

Change, though, won’t come in ways it might have if
nationalist had won in 2007. Muslim immigrants are
now the fastest growing segment of the European
population and their electoral weight grows with it.
Just last year, for example, Muslims tipped the
electoral balance to the left in both Belgium and
Netherlands, with 85 to 90 percent of them supporting
the socialists. For this reason, left-wing
politicians are increasing taking up Islamic causes:
Halal food in cafeterias, the removal of the Holocaust
myth from the school curriculum, prayer breaks, the
repression of symbols and behaviors that Muslim find
offensive, etc. (Incredible as it may seem, in Berlin
recently a Mozart opera was canceled because it
offended them).

As whites are outbred by the Third World swarms and
the luxury of an electoral solution becomes
increasingly illusory, internal differences within the
movement will also grow. Ten percent of the French
electorate is now Muslim and the right is becoming
increasingly divided in its relationship to them. Le
Pen appealed quite directly to them, though he did so
in opposition to many of his followers. Divisions
between anti-Islamists and pro-Islamists in
nationalist ranks are bound to widen. Already in
Austria it has caused the Freiheit party to split.

As France’s problems become more intractable and
draconian measures become more necessary, the ones to
suffer most will inevitably be whites, who will become
more alienated from the System and more sympathetic to
the nationalist movement that went down to defeat in
the April 22 election. But if Le Pen’s National Front
is to survive (and it is still a question if it
“should”), it will be forced to change. Part of this
cannot but entail a repudiation of the current
leadership and a shift from a purely electoral to a
militant, if not revolutionary orientation.

Life, as Nietzsche taught, is will to power and power
alone ensures the continuity of white life. Major
shifts in power, though, almost never occur through
elections (with the notable exception of the National
Revolution of 1933). Historically, paradigm-changing
power shifts occur only in periods of extreme crisis,
when the converging catastrophes affecting a system
become so unmanageable that those representing a
counter-system (a counter-hegemony) are able to seize
power.

To carry out such a revolutionary transformation and
ensure the perennity of our people demands, however,
not simply a will to power, it demands ideological
clarity, boots on the ground (in the form of a cadre
organization), and some sort of mass movement whose
leadership can be captured and mobilized against the
enemy system. Above all, it demands an uncompromising
commitment to an all-white nation free of alien
influences. These are all things the National Front
has forgotten. If the French are to resume their
destiny as a great nation, these are also things they
will have to re-learn.